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uthority over monetary policy has increas-
ingly been delegated to central banks with
substantially higher levels of independence
than in the past. This worldwide trend has propelled
the twin issues of accountability and transparency
to the forefront of the debate on monetary institu-
tions. The current debate is particularly intense on
the European side of the Atlantic where the forma-
tion of a European Central Bank (ECB) facing 12
different fiscal authorities and different types of
labor markets has transformed those previously
mainly academic questions into practical policy
issues.
There is nowadays a good deal of consensus
about the objectives and desirable organization of
monetary policymaking institutions. In particular,
there is widespread consensus that the main objec-
tive of monetary policy should be price stability,
that the central bank (CB) should have the freedom
to set the interest rate without political interference,
and that the objectives and the procedures followed
by the CB should be reasonably transparent. The
insistence on transparency is motivated by the
desire to ultimately make the CB accountable to
the general public either directly or through the
intermediation of elected officials. But once those
general principles are translated into operational
guidelines, some differences appear. The consensus
about transparency is most fragile to the introduc-
tion of practical guidelines, as illustrated by a recent
interchange between Buiter (1999) and Issing (1999).
Buiter’s position largely reflects what I have called
elsewhere the (new) Bank of England (BE) approach,
and Issing’s position reflects the approach of the
ECB, which has been largely shaped by the philos-
ophy of the Bundesbank (BB) during the last several
decades.1
Both approaches agree on the principle that a
CB should be transparent and accountable but differ
on the means to achieve those goals. The most vocal
disagreements have been about the early publication
of CB forecasts and the voting record of individual
monetary policy council members. The BE approach
is in favor of early release of this information, while
the BB approach is against it. Those differences partly
reflect the BB view that there should be “collective
responsibility” at the CB, while the BE approach
puts relatively more emphasis on the accountability
of individual council members. They also reflect
the fact that since the second half of the 1990s coun-
tries such as the United Kingdom and Sweden have
put in place an explicit mechanism of inflation target-
ing in conjunction with a numerically specified
inflation target that is decided upon by government.2
In such systems the early publication of CB forecasts
is believed to be an essential element of accountabil-
ity because it enables the principal (government) to
judge whether ex post deviations from the target
were due to poor performance by the agent (the CB)
or to unanticipated economic shocks. The colorful
debate about the publication of forecasts and CB
votes overshadowed two possibly more fundamental
areas in which most (perhaps even all) existing
central banks are rather opaque. One concerns the
economic model, or models, used in making policy
decisions, and the other concerns the operational
objectives of the CB.
This paper focuses on those issues. It has two
main parts. The first evaluates the degree of trans-
parency about the economic models used by con-
Alex Cukierman is a professor of economics at the Berglas School of
Economics, Tel-Aviv University, and a research fellow at the Center for
Economic Research, Tilburg University, and CEPR. Previous versions
of this paper were presented at the October 2000 Bundesbank/CFS
conference Transparency in Monetary Policy and at the September
2001 CEPR/ESI conference Old Age, New Economy and Central Banking
at the Bank of Finland. The author thanks Matthew Canzoneri, Jordi
Gali, Petra Geraats, Arie Kapteyn, and Carl Walsh for useful discussions.
© 2002, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
1 A fuller discussion of the differences between those two approaches
regarding the practical implementation of transparency and other
issues appears in the concluding section of Cukierman (2001). See
also de Haan and Eijffinger (2000) for an appraisal of the Buiter-Issing
interchange.
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the final formal authority to set the target resides with government.
By contrast, in the case of the BB and the ECB, the target is chosen by
the CB.temporary central banks and about their objective
functions. It argues that, in spite of the recently
acknowledged importance of transparency (particu-
larly in some inflation-targeting countries), there is
substantial haziness about the economic models
used by CBs to generate forecasts as well as about
their objective function. Some of this haziness is
due to the absence of clear knowledge about the
“true” model of the economy and some is due to
the attempt of policymakers to hedge their positions
in the face of model and of political uncertainties.
The second part of the paper examines whether
haziness about objectives matters for credibility
when monetary policymakers are more sensitive
to negative than to positive output gaps. The initial
motivation for this exercise is the following state-
ment from Blinder (1998, pp. 19-20), made shortly
after his resignation from the office of Vice Chairman
of the Fed: “In most situations the CB will take far
more political heat when it tightens preemptively
to avoid higher inflation than when it eases preemp-
tively to avoid higher unemployment.”
A fuller description of the second part of the
paper is provided after the following recent litera-
ture review.
Since the early 1980s the dominant academic
paradigm for conceptualizing the positive and sus-
tained inflation rates experienced by most countries
during the twentieth century has been the Kydland-
Prescott (1977) and Barro-Gordon (1983) framework
(henceforth KPBG). This view includes an inflation
bias that is due to the fact that, owing to tax and/or
other labor market imperfections, the natural level
of employment is lower than the level targeted by
policymakers. This induces policymakers to try to
stimulate employment by means of inflationary
surprises. Because the public anticipates such behav-
ior, it adjusts nominal wages (and other) contracts
accordingly, which leads to an equilibrium in which
inflation has a positive bias but output remains at
the natural level.
Recently two central bankers with strong aca-
demic backgrounds have expressed the view that
decisionmakers in their respective CBs are not trying
to maintain employment above its natural level and
conclude, therefore, that the KPBG bias story is not
applicable to their respective CBs.3 In particular,
Blinder (1998, p. 43) argues that policymakers at
the Fed do not try to systematically maintain employ-
ment above the natural level. As a matter of fact,
when in office, he personally felt duty bound to
conduct monetary policy so as to hit the natural
rate. In a similar vein, while recently summarizing
the U.K. experience with inflation targeting, John
Vickers (1998, p. 369) expressed the following view:
“There is a large literature on inflation bias but it
simply is not applicable to the MPC. We have no
desire to spring inflation surprises to try to bump
output above its natural rate (wherever that may be).”
Coming from a former Fed’s vice chairman and
from an executive director and chief economist at
the BE, such introspective statements certainly
deserve serious consideration, not the least because
acceptance of this view carries with it the important
implication that the credibility problem of monetary
policy is a thing of the past.4
In parallel, recent inflation targeters such as
the (reborn with instrument independence since
1997) BE acknowledge that, although their primary
objective is price stability, they are also averse to
excessive short-run fluctuations of actual output
around potential or natural output. Hence, they
attempt to achieve the inflation target on average
rather than in each period. In Mervyn King’s words,
they are not “inflation nutters” (e.g., see King, 1997).
For example, if an adverse supply shock pushes
inflation above target for some time, they do not
seek to put inflation back on target immediately
because of the associated excessive fluctuations
this would create in the output gap.
Svensson (1997) refers, somewhat more neu-
trally, to such a bank as a “flexible inflation targeter”
and to King’s “inflation nutter” as a “strict inflation
targeter.” Recent inflation targeters such as the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Sweden
have been rather transparent about the fact that they
are flexible rather than strict inflation targeters. In
terms of the familiar quadratic loss function used
by KPBG and much of the ensuing literature, this
means that, although they do not try to maintain
output above its natural level, their loss function
assigns a positive weight also to deviations of output
from its potential level. I shall refer to the relative
weight assigned to deviations of output from target
in comparison with deviations of inflation from
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3 McCallum (1995, 1997) expresses a similar view.
4 The views expressed by Blinder and Vickers are not inconsistent with
the existence of a KPBG inflationary bias prior to the 1990s, provided
that policymakers, at the time, believed in a stable tradeoff between
inflation and economic activity. As the idea of no tradeoff percolated
through policymaking circles during the 1990s, policymakers, realizing
the futility of attempting to maintain output above its natural level,
settled for the natural rate. Sargent (1999) models this process using
least-squares learning about the slope of the long-run Phillips curve.target as the “flexibility parameter” and denote it
by A.
In any precise characterization of optimal policy
in such a context, A is obviously an important deter-
minant of the speed with which policy seeks to put
inflation back on target following adverse shock
realizations. The larger is A, the larger is the “flexibil-
ity” allowed in returning to the inflation target fol-
lowing a shock. Hence, along the optimal policy plan
of a flexible inflation targeter, the parameter A deter-
mines the period-by-period deviations of inflation
from its target. In spite of its obvious importance
and of their insistence on transparency, recent infla-
tion targeters have been rather hazy about the mag-
nitude of the flexibility parameter. This is recognized
by Vickers (1998, p. 370) who candidly writes, “The
MPC remit is silent on this parameter of the loss
function, but optimal policy is arguably not too
sensitive to its value within a reasonable range.”5
While most explicit inflation targeters openly
admit that they are of the “flexible” variety, that
was not usually the case with the BB when it was
in charge of German monetary policy, nor is it cur-
rently the case with it successor—the ECB. In view
of the strong and unequivocal priority given to price
stability in the charter of those banks, their officials
probably prefer to view and to project to the public
an image of the bank as a strict, rather than a flexi-
ble, inflation targeter. But evidence presented in
Clarida and Gertler (1997) is consistent with the
view that the actual policy of the BB did not signifi-
cantly differ from that of a flexible inflation targeter.
Thus, there seems to be substantial haziness about
the parameter A among both explicit and implicit
inflation targeters.
The second part of the paper takes the state-
ments of Vickers (1998) and of Blinder (1998) (that
the output target of BE and Fed policymakers is the
natural level) at face value and examines the conse-
quences of flexible inflation targeting and of haziness
about the parameter A for credibility in the presence
of asymmetric objectives. Besides the statement by
Blinder hinting at an asymmetry in the objectives
of the U.S. political establishment, this exercise is
motivated by the following considerations.
Cukierman (2000a) shows that, with a Lucas-
type transmission mechanism, uncertainty about
the future state of the economy and asymmetries
in the output gap segment of the CB loss function,
there will be an inflation bias even if the CB targets
the normal level of output. This framework implies
that there should be a positive association between
the variability of economic activity over the cycle
and the magnitude of the inflation bias. Preliminary
cross-sectional evidence in Gerlach (2000) supports
this implication.6 Last but not least, the quadratic
objective function originally postulated by KPBG
carries the rather unintuitive implication that, given
inflation, an upward deviation of employment from
its desired level is as costly as a downward deviation
of the same size. It is hard to see why policymakers,
or social planners for that matter, would object,
given inflation, to a positive output gap. As a matter
of fact, it’s quite likely that, in the range of positive
output gaps, the quadratic function was postulated
mainly for analytical convenience rather than for
its descriptive realism.7
Because there is substantial uncertainty about
the correct model of the economy, the consequences
of asymmetric objectives are examined also for an
economy with a New Keynesian transmission
mechanism of the type recently reviewed by Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (1999). In this case there is an infla-
tion bias that has two distinct origins. One of those
arises, as in the case of an expectations-augmented
Phillips curve, due to the interaction of asymmetries
in the output gap segment of the loss function with
uncertainty about the future state of the economy.
Thus, flexible inflation targeting in conjunction with
asymmetric output gap objectives leads to credibility
problems even when policymakers target the average
natural level. Furthermore, contrary to conventional
wisdom (with an expectations-augmented Phillips
curve), this bias is an increasing function of the
extent to which the CB is “flexible” in targeting
inflation as measured by the parameter A. Because
this is precisely the parameter about which contem-
porary CBs tend to be hazy, it follows that there is
also uncertainty about the size of the bias.
The additional inflationary tendency that arises
in the New Keynesian framework is related to the
fact that, because prices are sticky, policymakers
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5 The qualifier refers to work by Bean (2000) and Batini and Haldane
(1999), who claim that for recent structural parameters of the United
Kingdom the optimal policy of a flexible inflation targeter is insensi-
tive to the precise value of A.
6 In addition, Ruge-Murcia (2001) provides individual time-series evi-
dence for several countries. His evidence supports the existence of
asymmetries in CB losses from deviations of unemployment from its
natural level for France and the United States but not for the United
Kingdom and Japan.
7 The quadratic function does not admit the possibility that policymakers
might have precautionary demands for expansions and for price sta-
bility. A formulation of policymakers’ objective functions that allows
for both possibilities appears in Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002).face a long-run tradeoff within some range between
average inflation and the average output gap. Policy-
makers with asymmetric losses from positive and
negative output gaps choose a point along this trade-
off that is characterized by both positive average
inflation and a positive average output gap.8
Section II documents existing haziness about
the economic models used by decisionmakers in
CBs and about the level of output that they target.
It is argued that, while a large part of this haziness
is due to lack of clear consensus about the transmis-
sion mechanism within the economic profession
itself, this state of affairs leaves quite a bit of discre-
tion to CBs and opens the door for strategic use of
information. Section III examines the extent to which
contemporary CBs are transparent about their objec-
tives and concludes that here, too, there is quite a
bit of haziness, particularly among the new “flexible
inflation targeters.” It then reviews recent theoretical
arguments and empirical work that support the
hypothesis that at least some CBs have different
attitudes about positive and negative output gaps.
Section IV shows, for a Lucas-type transmission
mechanism, that, in the presence of such asymme-
tries and uncertainty about the upcoming state of
the economy, policymakers “hedge” their position
on the side of expansion to reduce the likelihood
of surprise recessions. This behavior is shown to
induce an inflationary bias even when the policy-
makers’ output target is potential output. Section V
first shows that a similar mechanism operates also
in sticky price, New Keynesian models of the econ-
omy. But, because policymakers can control the
real rate of interest in such frameworks, asymmetric
preferences lead to an additional inflationary ten-
dency that is associated with average positive real
effects on the output gap.
II. HAZINESS ABOUT THE ECONOMIC
MODEL USED FOR MAKING POLICY
DECISIONS
Practically all CBs are rather noncommittal
about the economic model or models they use in
making policy decisions. Admittedly, many of the
major CBs have at least one big econometric model
of the economy in store. But the forecasts generated
by such models are only one of many inputs used
in formulating policy. Decisionmakers at major CBs
have access to a multitude of alternative “models”
and information. The aggregation of this information
by each board member and the further aggregation
of the position of each board member into a collec-
tive decision is a rather complex process; a full
description of this would require very detailed
tracking of the thought process of each board
member as well as of the interaction among the
board members. Vickers (1998, p. 370) candidly
admits that there are serious limits to how much
of this process can be put in the public domain9:
“While transparency—inflation reports, MPC
minutes, Treasury Committee hearings and so on—
increases what is in the public domain (desirably
in my view), there is surely information relevant
for policy-making that is simply incapable of being
put in the public domain.”
A substantial part of this ambiguity is caused in
the first place by the absence of consensus within
the economic profession about the correct model
of the economy. In the absence of consensus, a
“reasonable” central banker is likely to hedge his
position by intuitively assigning nonnegative weights
to alternative conceptions of the economy. This
complicates the decisionmaking process of central
bankers, makes them vulnerable to ex post criticism,
but also leaves them substantially more discretion
than they would have otherwise. As a matter of fact,
current economic literature entertains several con-
ceptually different views of the transmission process
of monetary policy even before taking into account
differing views about length of lags, parameter mag-
nitudes, and functional form within a given broad
conception of the transmission mechanism.
This section illustrates some of this conceptual
variety by briefly reviewing and contrasting three
well-known alternative conceptions of the transmis-
sion process of monetary policy used in the current
economic literature. One is a monetarist Lucas-type
expectations-augmented Phillips curve and the
other two are neo-Keynesian in spirit in that both
rely on staggered nominal price setting in conjunc-
tion with costs of price adjustment. In both variants
the CB is able to influence the real rate by means of
the nominal rate of interest because the price level
is temporarily sticky. In the first version, current
prices are fully backward looking in that current
pricing decisions depend only on predetermined
past prices. In the second version, they are fully
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8 I refer to this second mechanism as a “tendency” rather than a “bias”
because it is associated with some gain in the average value of output.
9 Even if all those details could be put in the public domain, it is unlikely
that, because of cognitive limitations, the bulk of the (largely non-
professional) public would absorb and digest them accurately. A fuller
discussion of those and related issues appears in Winkler (2000).forward looking in that current pricing decisions
depend on expected future inflation rather than on
past pricing decisions.10
A Monetarist Lucas-Type Transmission
Mechanism (Model 1)
This transmission mechanism is the one most
frequently used in models of endogenous monetary
policy. The main idea is that monetary policy has
real effects only to the extent that it creates unex-
pected inflation. In particular, the deviation of out-
put from its natural level is an increasing function
of unexpected inflation. Formally,
(1) yt ≡Yt –Ynt=α(πt –Etπt), α>0,
where Y and Yn are actual and natural output, π is
the rate of inflation, Eπ is the (rational) expectation
of that rate of inflation when output decisions are
made, and t is a time index. The instrument of
monetary policy is not modeled explicitly, but it
is assumed, at least implicitly, that the monetary
authority can set its instrument (the money supply
or the interest rate) so as to bring about the inflation
rate that it desires. Hence, from a formal point of
view the “instrument” of the monetary authority
here is the rate of inflation.11 Equation (1) is also
known as an expectations-augmented Phillips curve.
In its starkest monetarist interpretation, prices and
wages are fully flexible and monetary policy has
real effects only when inflation is not currently
fully perceived. In the presence of nominal wage
contracts, which are preset one period in advance
on the basis of expected future inflation, there are
real effects when there are deviations between the
rate of inflation that had been expected at contract-
ing time and the subsequent realization of inflation.




In this framework, the current output gap, nor-
mally defined as the deviation of actual from poten-
tial output, depends on the lagged real interest rate
and on its own lagged value. Current inflation is
positively related to the lagged value of the output
gap and to its own lagged value. A compact formula-
tion of the model, due to Svensson (1997), is
(2) xY Y i E x g tt p t t t t t t ++ + + ≡− = −− () ++ 11 1 1 ϕπ φ,
(3)
where Ypt is potential output; xt is the output gap;
πt+1 is the rate of inflation between period t and
period t+1; Etπt+1 is the (rational) public’s forecast
of this inflation given the information available to
it in period t; it is the nominal rate of interest on
one-period loans contracted in period t; ut+1 is a
cost shock; gt is a nonmonetary shock to aggregate
demand; and ϕ, φ, and λare nonnegative parameters.
Note that although there is some analogy between
xt and yt from the first model, they are not identical
since natural and potential output are not necessar-
ily identical concepts. The difference between them
is discussed later in this section.
In this framework, the monetary policy instru-
ment is the nominal rate of interest. Because of
price stickiness, the CB can affect the real rate (and
through it the output gap and future inflation) by
its choice of the nominal rate. Svensson (1997) notes
that, in spite of its simplicity, this model captures
some of the essential features of more elaborate
econometric models used by some CBs. The model
reflects the declared belief of some CBs, such as
the BE, that current interest rate policy affects the
output gap with a lag of one period and the rate of
inflation only with a lag of two periods. The model
is fully backward looking in that current pricing
behavior depends only on lagged variables.
A New Keynesian Transmission
Mechanism with Forward-Looking
Pricing (Model 3)
The main difference between this framework
and the previous one is that current price setting
and the current output gap depend on expectations
of future inflation and on the expected future output
gap, respectively, rather than on the lagged values
of those variables. Thus, the model is fully forward
looking. The main idea is that a change in expecta-
tions of future variables alters current pricing behav-
ior. This modification has its origin in more explicit
microeconomic foundations with monopolistic
competition and costs of price adjustment. A stylized
ππ λ tt t t xu ++ =+ + 11 ,
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10 An additional transmission channel that is not captured by either of
those models is the credit channel.
11 In some versions of this model, policymakers have only imperfect
control of inflation. In such a case the planned rate of inflation becomes
the instrument of monetary policy.
12 A fuller discussion appears in Cukierman (1992, Chap. 3).aggregate version of such a model has recently been
summarized compactly by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999) and is reproduced as follows:
(4)
(5)
Here ϕ, λ, and β are positive coefficients. All the
variables have the same meaning as in the previous
model. The expected future output gap appears in
the output gap equation to reflect the notion that,
because individuals smooth consumption, expecta-
tions of higher consumption next period (associated
with higher expected output) leads them to demand
more current consumption, which raises current
output.
As in stylized models of sticky staggered prices
pioneered by Calvo (1983), current inflation depends
on future expected inflation. In this type of model,
only a fraction of firms has the opportunity to
adjust its price each period and, because of costs
of price adjustment, each firm adjusts its price at
discrete intervals. Hence, when it is given the chance
to adjust its price, the firm adjusts it by more the
higher is expected future inflation. This interpreta-
tion implies that β is a discount factor.
Comparison Between the Conceptions
Underlying the Different Models
The three models above are grounded in differ-
ent conceptions regarding the channels through
which monetary policy affects output and inflation.
In the Lucas-type model, monetary policy affects
output only if it is unanticipated, either currently
or when relevant nominal contracts have been con-
cluded. Inflation in those types of models is usually
thought of as being directly related to the choice of
money supply via the quantity theory of money.
By contrast, in the last two models, because output
is demand determined, a change in the rate of inter-
est by affecting demand also affects output indepen-
dently of whether inflation is anticipated or not.
Furthermore, the effect of policy on inflation in
those models is through the effect that policy has
on the output gap.
The main conceptual difference between the
second and third models is this: In the second model,
the current policy cannot affect current inflation
or the current output gap; in the third model, current
policy can affect the current values of both variables
by changing current expectations of future variables.
πλ β π ttt tt xE u =+ + +1 .
xi EE x g tt t t t t t =− − () ++ ++ ϕπ 11 ,
Woodford (1999) utilizes this feature of the third
model to show that, under an appropriate form of
commitment to interest rate inertia, changes in
current policy, by changing expectations, have an
immediate effect on inflation and the output gap.
This is a far cry from the BE view (illustrated by the
second model) in which policy in year t can affect
inflation only from year t+2 onward.
Haziness About the Meaning of
Potential or Normal Output
At the broad conceptual level, potential output
is meant to capture long-term supply determinants
of output. But there are several related concepts
such as the natural level of output and the NAIRU
(non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment).
At the empirical level, those concepts are often
implemented by means of some statistical smooth-
ing procedure such as the Hodrick-Prescott (1997)
filter.
Are those concepts identical? I believe the
answer is not necessarily. In the work of Friedman
(1968) and subsequent U.S.-based neo-monetarists
like Lucas (1972, 1973), the conception of the natural
level of employment is the level of employment
that is generated by the real general equilibrium of
the system in the absence of inflationary surprises.
Its counterpart in the United Kingdom is the NAIRU.
Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, pp. 14-15)
characterize this rate as the rate of unemployment
below which inflation is accelerating and above
which it is decelerating.
Although related, the concepts developed by
Lucas and Layard, Nickell, and Jackman are not
necessarily identical. More importantly, both con-
cepts generally differ from potential output because,
due to the existence of real business cycles, the gap
between actual and potential output may be non-
zero even when inflation is fully expected and the
rate of inflation is stable. As a consequence, the out-
put gap, xt, from neo-Keynesian frameworks is not
identical to the monetarist deviation, yt, of actual
from natural output. Nor is there a clear relation
between the output gap and the deviation of actual
output from the NAIRU.
Woodford (2002) proposes to conceptualize
potential output as the equilibrium level of output
under full price flexibility and to view the output
gap as arising from the existence of sticky prices.
Although useful and elegant, this conception of the
output gap does not provide guidance about how
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bility. It would appear that the relation between this
concept and the smoothing procedures used to
measure potential output in practice (such as the
Hodrick-Prescott filter, 1997) is rather tenuous.
Implications for Model Transparency
and for Accountability
The brief survey of alternative current models
of the transmission process presented above illus-
trates the objective difficulties faced by the contem-
porary honest central banker. When faced with
those and other different conceptions of how the
economy works, what will he do? It is likely that
he is going to intuitively assign some nonnegative
weight to each of the models and to many other
bits of information and ideas not surveyed here.13
What should he do when asked to be transparent
about the economic model he is using to generate
forecasts? This is not just an academic but also a
practical question. As a matter of fact, when recently
confronted with such a demand, the president of
the ECB (Duisenberg) responded by promising to
publish, in due time, the forecasts generated by the
econometric model of the ECB. Although such an
action is desirable, it is unlikely to come close to
the actual aggregation of information and of models
that decisionmakers at the ECB, the BE, or the Fed
go through when making monetary policy decisions.
To a large extent, the inability of central bankers
to be fully transparent about the economic model
or models they are using is tied to the proliferation
of alternative views of the transmission mechanism
within the economic profession. Because central
bankers are consumers and not providers of econ-
omic models, they obviously cannot be faulted for
this state of affairs.14 But the absence of consensus
about the “correct” model of the economy endows
them with considerable discretion, which they can
also use to hedge their positions in the face of model
uncertainty and of political pressures. It also opens
the door for the strategic use of information.15
Most contemporary CBs are pretty transparent
about their inflation target, both in terms of the
index used and the numerical target value. There is
substantially less transparency about output targets.
Even in countries that insist on high levels of trans-
parency like the United Kingdom, there is quite a
bit of murkiness about the output or employment
target that the CB is supposed to attain.
Again, a nonnegligible part of this haziness about
the output target is due to (and made possible by)
the different concepts of “normal” output surveyed
above. Those different conceptions allow substantial
leeway for the measurement of potential or natural
output, leaving room for the reintroduction of dis-
cretionary monetary policy through the back door.
This is obviously the case whether or not the out-
put target of contemporary CBs is at the natural or
the potential level of output or above them.16
In the long run, transparency and accountability
will be enhanced when better and more accurate
models of the ways monetary policy affects the
economy become available. The wider implication
of this conclusion is that, until this happens, account-
ability by means of transparency about the econ-
omic models used by decisionmakers at the CB will
be limited. What should be done in the mean time?
There is no easy answer to this question. My own
view is that, given the current state of economic
knowledge, the discharge of accountability should
be achieved to a large extent by two things: appoint-
ing as decisionmakers at the CB individuals with
high levels of integrity and professional standards
and making sure these decisionmakers have little
or no association with particular interest groups.
III. ARE NEW CENTRAL BANKS
TRANSPARENT ABOUT THEIR 
OBJECTIVES?
In comparison with past decades, there is nowa-
days substantially more transparency about the
main objective of monetary policy. In most contem-
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13 Jensen (2001) presents a compact hybrid neo-Keynesian model that
combines forward- with backward-looking elements. Using a more
elaborate hybrid model of the same type for the United States,
Rudebusch (2001) estimates the weight on forward-looking elements
to be around one-third and the weight on backward-looking elements
to be around two-thirds.
14 One way to bridge the gap between this proliferation of models and
practical policymaking is to look for a policy rule that is uniformly
best for many models. A recent attempt for two variants of micro-
founded structural models appears in McCallum and Nelson (1999).
Hansen and Sargent (2000) develop a systematic analysis for decision-
making when policymakers cannot distinguish between economic
models within a given class.
15 Reflecting on his term in office as Chairman of the Board of the Fed,
Burns once said that when Keynesians on one side and monetarists
on the other assailed him with diametrically opposite criticisms, he
found it safe to duck in the middle.
16 Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997) show, for the United States, that
there is substantial uncertainty about the location of the natural rate.
Faust and Svensson (2001) show that more ex post transparency about
the output target of policymakers raises social welfare.porary CBs, the main legally mandated objective of
monetary policy is price stability and all other objec-
tives are either nonexistent (as is nearly the case in
the charter of the ECB) or relegated to being (at least
legally) a distant second priority (as is the case with
the growth and employment objectives in the char-
ter of the BE). This is a far cry from the 1980s and
previous decades during which most CB charters
featured several conflicting objectives with no clear
specification of the subjective tradeoffs among
them. Nowadays all explicit inflation targeters even
specify a precise numerical value in terms of a well-
defined index for the target rate of inflation, and
even the ECB, which is not an explicit inflation tar-
geter, has specified a numerical inflation target for
the euro area.
In spite of those advances, there still are non-
negligible dark spots about the output gap segment
of the loss function of modern CBs. For truly strict
inflation targeters, or inflation nutters, this murki-
ness is unimportant. Because the output gap is not
part of their objectives, transparency about the out-
put gap segment of their loss function is irrelevant.
But practically all explicit inflation targeters openly
acknowledge that they also care about the output
gap, i.e., they are flexible rather than strict inflation
targeters. For such banks the features of the output
gap segment of the loss function and its importance
relative to achieving the inflation target in each
period become relevant. To illustrate, consider the




When A=0, the CB is a strict inflation targeter,
so murkiness about f(xt) does not matter. But when
A is positive, the CB is a flexible inflation targeter so
that murkiness about the precise form of the function
f(xt) and the magnitude of the parameter A become
important. Following Svensson (1997) I will refer
to A as the “flexibility parameter.”17 There is little
doubt that all CBs are quite opaque about the param-
eter A. This is admitted quite candidly in a recent
review of the U.K. experience with inflation target-
ing by Vickers who notes that the MPC’s remit is
silent on the parameter A (the full quote and source
appear in the latter part of the introduction).
Ironically, the lack of transparency about f(xt)
seems to matter the most in countries like the United
Kingdom, which strongly insist on formal trans-
parency, and the least in countries like Germany,
which, judging by the BB charter, should be classi-
fied as a strict inflation targeter. But the matter is
not that simple. Recent empirical work by Clarida
and Gertler (1997) supports the view that the
Bundesbank actually conducted policy in a way that
is indistinguishable from that of a flexible inflation
targeter. As a matter of fact, the currently emerging
consensus seems to be that, whether they admit it
or not, all CBs are behaving in a manner that is con-
sistent with flexible inflation targeting. The main
difference, on this view, is only whether the bank
and its charter admit the “flexible” part openly or
not. In terms of the loss function in equation (6),
this means that there generally is a lack of trans-
parency with respect to the coefficient A.
How about f(xt)? Available public information
on this term is rather scant for two reasons. First,
neither the CB nor the political authorities have
taken the trouble to indicate what it is. Vickers (1998,
p. 370) ventures several remarks on the shape of
the BE’s loss function since 1997 and concludes
that, at least as far as inflation is concerned, losses
are symmetric; but he remains silent on what the
shape of f(xt) might be. Secondly, as discussed at
some length in the previous section, there are
numerous ambiguities in the definition of potential,
normal, natural, and NAIRU output. Obviously the
output gap that enters into the loss function inherits
those ambiguities. In summary, existing CBs are
generally quite opaque about their output objective,
the shape of the function f(.), and the flexibility of
the parameter A.
The Case for Asymmetries in CB Losses
from the Output Gap
In the absence of solid information about f(.),
the academic literature has assumed that f(.) is a
quadratic function implying that losses from nega-
tive and from positive output gaps are the same as
long as the absolute value of the gap is the same.18
But it is hard to see why CBs, social planners, or
political authorities would consider, given inflation,
a positive output gap of a given magnitude to be
equivalent to a negative output gap of the same
magnitude. A negative output gap means that
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17 Note that A is the inverse of Rogoff’s parameter of CB conservativeness.
The terminology in the text is chosen to highlight the fact that, within
the context of the present discussion, it determines the degree of
flexibility in allowing temporary deviations from the inflation target.
18 From here on, I abstract for simplicity from the ambiguities in the
definition of the output gap and assume that the output target of
monetary authorities is equal to a well-defined and publicly known
measure of “potential or natural output.”employment is below the normal level, whereas a
positive output gap means employment is above
the normal level. While casual observation suggests
that policymakers dislike employment below the
normal level, it does not support the notion that,
given inflation, they also dislike employment above
the normal level.19
Recently this casual empiricism got backing
from Blinder after his resignation from the office
of Vice Chairman of the Fed. Blinder expressed the
view that the Fed takes far more political heat when
it tightens preemptively to avoid inflation than when
it eases preemptively to avoid unemployment (the
precise quote and reference appear in the introduc-
tion). To the extent that the CB is not totally indiffer-
ent to the priorities of the political establishment,
this asymmetry is likely to partially affect the Fed’s
policy choices. Preliminary empirical work by
Gerlach (2000) and by Dolado, Maria-Dolores, and
Naveira (2000) supports this hypothesis for the Fed.20
Recent theoretical work by Cukierman (2000a)
shows that, with (i) a Lucas-type transmission mecha-
nism, (ii) uncertainty about the future state of the
economy, and (iii) asymmetries in the output gap
segment of the CB loss function, there will be an
inflation bias even if the CB targets the normal level
of output. This framework implies that there should
be a positive association between the variability of
employment over the cycle and the magnitude of
the inflation bias. Preliminary cross-sectional evi-
dence in Gerlach (2000) supports this implication.
Using a formulation that nests both symmetric and
asymmetric losses from deviations of unemployment
from its natural level, Ruge-Murcia (2001) performs
a test of the asymmetry hypothesis over time within
several countries and finds support for this hypothe-
sis in France and the United States.
In summary, in spite of the silence of policy-
makers about the shape of f(.), there seem to be
sufficient early indications to warrant a more serious
investigation of the consequences of an asymmetric
f(.). The remainder of the paper investigates the
consequences of this asymmetry for the credibility
of monetary policy and related issues.
IV. IS THE CREDIBILITY PROBLEM
GONE WHEN THE CENTRAL BANK
TARGETS THE NORMAL LEVEL OF
OUTPUT?
The discussion in this section and the next one
is built on two presumptions. The first is that con-
temporary CBs do not attempt to maintain output
above its normal or natural level, and thus there is
no credibility problem because of the classical KPBG
reasons. In accepting these presumptions, this sec-
tion takes at face value the statements by Blinder
and Vickers and also addresses McCallum’s (1995,
1997) criticism of the KPBG conception of the rea-
sons for inflation. It will be recalled that those state-
ments and McCallum’s arguments imply that the
output target of central bankers is identical to the
normal or potential level of output. The second
presumption is that the CB loss function is more
sensitive to negative than to positive output gaps.
The main results of the section are as follows:
1. The presence of asymmetries in losses from
the output gap in conjunction with uncertainty
on the part of the CB about the state of the
economy induces an inflation bias even when
the CB targets potential or natural output.
2. There is no bias when the CB is a strict infla-
tion stabilizer (A=0).
Those results hold both for a Lucas-type, expec-
tations-augmented Phillips curve and for many other
models including, in particular, a New Keynesian,
sticky/staggered prices transmission mechanism
of the type reviewed in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999). But in the second case there is an additional
inflationary tendency that arises even when deci-
sionmakers at the CB are fully informed about the
relevant shocks at the time policy choices are made.
This section demonstrates the existence of a bias
within the framework of a Lucas-type expectations-
augmented Phillips curve (model 1). The next sec-
tion shows that, in addition to this bias, there is in
New Keynesian economies (model 3) an additional
average inflationary tendency. A third result holds
true for both a Lucas-type and a New Keynesian
transmission mechanism:
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19 Given inflation, some politicians probably even like positive output
gaps on the view that the higher output is, the better it is. As a matter
of fact, it is quite likely that the quadratic function on the output gap,
so often used in the academic literature, was chosen mainly for analyti-
cal convenience rather than for descriptive realism. In the usual KPBG
setup this assumption does not make a difference as long as policy-
makers do not face uncertainty or are risk neutral because the equilib-
rium is in the range of negative output gaps in which the quadratic is
reasonable. A formulation of the KPBG framework under certainty
in which the quadratic is limited to the range of negative output gaps
without making any difference for their basic result appears in
Cukierman (1992, Chap. 3, equation (3.1)). But once it is recognized
that policymakers face uncertainty, the characteristics of their objective
function in the entire range of output gaps become important.
20 However, Dolado, Maria-Dolores, and Naveira (2000) do not find evi-
dence of asymmetry in losses from the output gap for the BB, the
Banque de France, or the Banco de Espana.3. Other things the same, the bias is larger the
larger the (inflation targeting) flexibility
parameter A is.
An Asymmetry-Cum-Uncertainty
Inflation Bias with a Lucas-Type
Transmission Mechanism
The results in this subsection draw on Cukierman
(2000a). Here I briefly present the basic framework,
the main result, and the intuition underlying it and
move on to discuss its wider implications. (See that
article for further details and some of the deriva-
tions.) The asymmetry in CB losses regarding the
output gap is modeled by postulating that period
t’s loss function is given by
(7)
where xt ≡Yt –Ypt is the output gap. This specifica-
tion of the loss function states that the employment
target of policymakers is potential output and that
as long as the output gap is negative the standard
quadratic loss function is in effect. But when the
output gap is positive or zero, policymakers do not
incur any losses or gains. The kink at the zero out-
put gap introduces an effect that is analogous to
the condition that leads to a precautionary saving
motive in the theory of savings and consumption
under uncertainty. A basic result from this literature
is that there is a precautionary saving motive if and
only if marginal utility is convex, i.e., the third deriva-
tive is positive (Kimball, 1990).21 I shall return to
the consequences of this analogy later.
The natural level of output is given by
(8) Ynt=Ypt+εt,
where εt=Ynt –Ypt is the output gap in the absence
of inflationary surprises. Actual output is given by
the expectations-augmented Phillips curve in equa-
tion (1). For simplicity, εt is specified as a zero-mean
stochastic shock to the natural level of output with
































both by the choice of monetary policy and by the
realization of the shock, εt, and is given by the fol-
lowing equation:
(9) πt=mt–γεt,
where mt is the rate of inflation planned by the CB
and γ is a positive parameter that determines the
effect of shocks to employment on inflation. For
concreteness I think of εt as a supply shock so its
effect on inflation is negative. But the basic result
of this subsection goes through also when εt is a
demand shock so that γ is negative or when εt is a
combination of supply and demand shocks. Equation
(9) states that, given planned inflation, actual infla-
tion is lower the larger the supply shock to the econ-
omy is. Provided there is no instrument uncertainty,
this formulation is consistent both with situations
in which the policy instrument is the interest rate
as well as with situations in which it is some nomi-
nal shock.
I focus on a one-shot game with three stages.
The sequence of events and the structure of infor-
mation is as follows. First, expectations, Et–1πt, are
formed and embedded into nominal contracts. In the
second stage, the CB picks the value of its instrument,
mt. Finally, the stochastic real shock to employ-
ment, εt, realizes and determines, along with mone-
tary policy, both employment and inflation. This
sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1. A crucial
element is that, when it chooses the setting of its
instrument, the CB is uncertain about the magnitude
of the real shock to output. This is a fortiori true
for the public when they form their expectation.
The shock, εt, affects employment directly as
well as indirectly by creating, given monetary policy,
unanticipated inflation in a direction that is opposite
to the sign of the shock. From equations (1), (8), and
(9) the combined marginal impact of the shock on
employment is
(10) q ≡1–αγ.
I assume that the direct effect of the shock on
24 JULY/AUGUST 2002
21 The kink at zero in equation (7) implies that the marginal benefit from
higher economic activity is globally convex.
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Figure 1
The Sequence of Events
1. Et –1πt is formed → 2. policy, mt, chosen → 3. εt realizes.employment dominates its indirect effect by means
of unexpected inflation so that q is positive. Substi-
tuting equations (1), (8), and (9) into the loss function




e≡Et–1πt, and the time index has
been suppressed for simplicity. Minimization of
equation (11) with respect to m yields the following
reaction function for the monetary authority:
(12)
I turn next to expectation formation which
occurs at the first stage of the game. Although
individuals do not know the realization of ε at this
stage, they do know its stochastic structure as well
as the structure of the economy and of CB objectives.
Taking the expected value of inflation in equation
(9) conditioned on this information as the opera-
tional proxy for the public’s rational expectation
of inflation, we obtain
(13)
In equilibrium, both equations (12) and (13) must be
satisfied. It follows that π
e–m=0 so that equation
(13) becomes
(14)
G(0) is the probability of a recession. More precisely
it is the probability that the realization of the employ-
ment shock, ε, is lower than the mean of this shock,
which is zero. E[ε|ε<0] is the expected value of ε
conditioned on the economy being in a recession
(ε negative). Because the probability of a recession
is positive and the expected value of ε conditioned
on the economy being in a recession is negative,
both planned and expected inflation are positive.
Furthermore, in spite of its attempt to reduce the
size of recessions, the CB has no influence on output,
which remains at its natural level. Had the CB been
committed to a zero rate of monetary expansion,
output would still be at its natural level. Hence there
is an “inflationary bias” on average.
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Intuitively, this bias arises because the CB is more
sensitive to policy errors in which monetary policy
is too tight than to policy errors in which it is too
expansionary, in conjunction with the fact that it
does not have perfect information about the state
of the economy. The upshot is that an inflationary
bias arises even when the CB targets potential out-
put. This bias arises whenever the CB is more averse
to negative than to positive output gaps, in conjunc-
tion with the fact that it is uncertain about the state
of the economy. The second condition is obviously
highly realistic, and the first one appears to be satis-
fied for at least some CBs.
Although, as in KPBG, the bias arises because
of the CB concern (at least in some states of nature)
about the output gap, the new bias identified here
does not rely on dynamic inconsistency. To see this,
note that this bias is present also if the choice of
policy in Figure 1 precedes the formation of expec-
tations, as long as both the formation of expectations
and the choice of policy precede the resolution of
uncertainty about the shock, εt. The origin of the
bias resides, instead, in the precautionary behavior
of the CB with respect to recessions in a world of
uncertainty, in conjunction with the public’s aware-
ness of this asymmetry in CB objectives.22
Discussion
The expression for the inflation bias in equation
(14) implies that, other things the same, the bias is
larger the larger is the variability of natural output.
Gerlach (2000) presents preliminary cross-sectional
evidence suggesting that there is a positive associa-
tion between the average level of inflation in a
country and the variance of its rate of growth. In
related work Ruge-Murcia (2001) finds a positive
(over time) relation between inflation and the con-
ditional variance of unemployment in the United
States and France. Given his model, this finding sup-
ports the view that policymakers in those countries
are more averse to negative than to positive output
gaps. Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002) find evidence
of nonlinearity in interest rate reaction functions
for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan.
The pattern of these nonlinearities supports the
existence of a precautionary demand for expan-
sions in the post-1985 period in the United States.
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22 Obviously, it is not easy to verify ex post whether the CB is conducting
policy so as to build in a precautionary demand for expansions. As a
consequence, it is not straightforward to verify a precommittment to
conduct policy in a symmetric manner.As demonstrated earlier, this type of precautionary
demand leads to an inflation bias.
Equation (14) also implies that the bias is an
increasing function of the flexibility parameter, A.
Hence CBs of countries that are more flexible
inflation targeters have a more serious credibility
problem. Because we saw earlier that transparency
concerning the flexibility parameter is generally
rather poor, the magnitude of this bias is generally
opaque too. But, holding other things the same, it is
likely to be higher in countries such as the United
Kingdom than in the euro area. This is true if only
because the 1997 charter of the BE explicitly men-
tions growth and employment as objectives for the
CB, whereas that of the ECB does not.
Those rather pessimistic conclusions appear
to conflict, at first sight, with the remarkable era
of price stability that Western democracies have
recently experienced. The “new inflation bias story”
presented here is consistent with this observation
because it implies that, when the probability of
recession is low and/or its expected depth mild,
the bias will be negligible for most values of the
flexibility parameter, A. But this observation should
also be taken as a warning against overoptimism in
the long run. In particular, if and when the likelihood
of a serious recession increases, the countries of
more flexible inflation targeters are likely to expe-
rience larger inflationary accelerations.
Let me conclude this discussion with a theo-
retical remark regarding the analogy between the
behavior of policymakers in the “new inflation bias
story” presented above and the theory of precau-
tionary savings. The kink at a zero output gap in
the loss function in equation (7) implies that the
marginal benefit from higher economic activity is
globally convex. As shown by Kimball (1990) there
is a precautionary saving motive if and only if the
marginal utility from consumption is convex. Simi-
larly, asymmetric preferences with respect to the
output gap induce a precautionary demand for
expansions on the part of central bankers. This
precautionary demand induces them to conduct a
somewhat looser policy in comparison with the
benchmark case of symmetric losses from the out-
put gap.23
But there is also a crucial difference between
the two cases. While the individual consumer “buys”
more desired future security by foregoing some
current consumption, the central banker does not
buy any improvement in economic activity because
individuals in the economy undo this potential
improvement by setting their nominal contracts in
a way that anticipates this tendency of the central
banker.
V. THE EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC
LOSSES FROM THE OUTPUT GAP IN
NEW KEYNESIAN FRAMEWORKS
This section investigates the consequences of
an asymmetric objective function, as specified in
equation (7), when the economic structure is char-
acterized by a New Keynesian transmission mech-
anism with forward-looking pricing of the type given
by equations (4) and (5). This section discusses two
related but distinct issues. First, it shows that the
presence of asymmetries in conjunction with uncer-
tainty about future shocks produces an inflation
bias also in New Keynesian frameworks. Second, it
shows that, in New Keynesian frameworks, there
usually is an additional inflationary tendency and
an associated positive average output gap, both of
which obtain even in the absence of uncertainty
about future shocks. For simplicity I abstract from
persistence in the stochastic behavior of the shocks
gtand utby assuming that both are zero-mean white-
noise processes.
Asymmetric Output Gap Losses
Produce a Bias Also in New Keynesian
Frameworks
The mechanism that produces the inflationary
bias in the Lucas-type transmission mechanism
depends mainly on the fact that the objective func-
tion is asymmetric in conjunction with the follow-
ing: that, when choosing policy, the CB is uncertain
about the realization of shocks at the time its policy
decision is going to affect the economy. In particular,
this type of mechanism will, most likely, operate
within the framework of other transmission pro-
cesses, including (linear) New Keynesian transmis-
sion processes, as long as the CB possesses the loss
function in equation (7) and is uncertain about the
relevant state of the economy. This intuitive argu-
ment is demonstrated rigorously in what follows.
The hasty reader may just take note of equation
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23 Incidentally, this analogy also implies that there will be a tendency
to inflate for all asymmetric output gap loss functions in which the
marginal benefit of higher economic activity is convex in the level
of output. Another specification of an asymmetric output gap loss
function that satisfies this requirement appears in Ruge-Murcia (2001),
who specifies losses of deviations from natural unemployment as a
linex function.(18) and go directly to proposition 1. Substituting





p is the rate of
inflation implicitly planned by the policymaker
when he sets the interest rate at it. Solving out for
the interest rate,
(16)
Substituting equation (16) into equation (4), rearrang-
ing, and using the last expression in (15) to express




which states that, given expectations and the realiza-
tion of the shock gt, the output gap is more likely
to be negative the lower the planned rate of inflation.
Hence, equation (17) implies that if policymakers
desire to reduce a negative output gap, they must
plan a higher rate of inflation.
Consider now a CB whose objective is to 
minimize
(18)
where δ is the discount factor and Lt is given by
equation (7). Because there are no endogenous state
variables and no persistence in shocks, the minimiza-
tion problem in equation (18) reduces to a series of
one-period minimization problems and the expected
values of inflation and the output gap are time invari-
ant. I shall, therefore, omit time indices from now
on. Equation (7) implies that, in each period, the
form of the loss function depends on whether the
output gap is negative or not. Equation (17) implies
that the output gap is negative if and only if
(19)
which is equivalent to
(20)
In this case the loss is given by the first line in equa-
tion (7), and otherwise it is given by the second line
in that equation. Substituting (19) into equation (7)
and applying the expected value operator, the typical
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one-period, time-invariant minimization problem
is to choose π
p so as to minimize the following
expression:
(21)
where F[g] is the density function of g and E is the
expected value operator. Differentiating with respect
to π
p and rearranging yields the following policy
reaction function for the rate of inflation planned
by the CB:
(22)
Because individuals understand the modus operandi
of the CB and have rational expectations, expected
inflation, π




e in equation (22) and rearranging
yields
(23)
This equation determines π
p only implicitly
because π
p also appears in the argument of the
distribution function F[.] and in the expected value
on the right-hand side of (23). It is nonetheless
possible to establish that π
p must be positive. The
denominator in equation (23) is positive. Hence, the
sign of planned inflation is determined by the sign
of the numerator whose sign is opposite to that of
the conditional expected value in the numerator.
Thus, if
then π
p must be positive. Because g has a zero
expected value, the conditional expected value, 
is negative for all possible values of π
p, except for
the extreme case in which π
p is equal to minus
infinity and β<1. In this case, the right-hand side
of equation (23) implies that π
p is zero, which con-
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p is equal to
minus infinity. Hence, only positive values of planned
inflation are possible in an equilibrium with asym-
metric preferences. The main conclusion is summa-
rized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the presence of asymmetric out-
put gap objectives and CB uncertainty about future
shocks to the economy, there is an inflation bias
also in the New Keynesian framework.
This bias arises in spite of the fact that the CB
does not gain anything from having a positive output
gap. It arises instead, as was the case with a Lucas
supply function, because of a precautionary demand
for expansions by the CB. The next proposition
examines the impact of the flexibility parameter, A,
on this bias.
Proposition 2. The bias in proposition 1 is larger
the larger is the flexibility parameter, A.
Proof: Differentiating equation (23) with respect to
A,
Because 
is negative and all the remaining terms are positive,
this expression is positive. QED.
Thus, as was the case with a Lucas supply func-
tion, the bias is larger the larger is the flexibility
parameter, A.
The Additional Inflationary “Tendency”
of New Keynesian Frameworks
The previous subsection shows that the results
obtained in Section IV for a Lucas supply function
carry over to the New Keynesian framework. But in
the case of the New Keynesian framework, there is
an additional mechanism that tends to make inflation
even higher. This additional inflationary tendency
is directly related to the fact that, due to temporary
price stickiness, the CB is able to alter the real rate
of interest and through it the level of employment
and production. This happens even when the CB
knows future shocks to the economy with certainty.



























































tional inflation-creating mechanism in isolation by
assuming that the CB has full information about
relevant shocks at the time policy choices are made.
In terms of model 3 (from Section II on the specifica-
tion of models, pp. 19-20) this means that the CB
knows gt and ut when it picks period t’s interest rate,
it. Because there are no endogenous state variables
and future expectations are not affected by current
policy, the minimization of the objective function
in equation (18) is again equivalent to period-by-
period minimization.
In each period there are two possible alternative
interest rate rules for the CB. If the realization of
the cost shock, ut, is such that, given inflationary
expectations, the output gap is either positive or
zero when inflation is maintained at zero, the CB
picks the rate of interest that achieves the zero
inflation target. In this range the CB behaves as an
“inflation nutter,” or strict inflation targeter. If the
realization of the cost shock, ut, is such that, given
inflationary expectations, the output gap is negative
at a zero rate of inflation, the CB faces a tradeoff
between its output and its inflation objective. Hence,
given inflationary expectations, it picks the interest
rate that equalizes the marginal loss from inflation
to the marginal loss from a negative output gap. In
this range the CB behaves as a flexible inflation
targeter. Equations (4) and (5) imply that, at a zero
inflation rate,24
(24)
In the first case the CB just picks the nominal rate
of interest that achieves the zero inflation target.
Equations (4) and (5) imply that in this case the
interest rate rule is25
(25)
In the second case there is a meaningful intra-
period tradeoff between the inflation and the output
gap targets. Hence, the CB picks the nominal interest
rate so as to minimize
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24 Non-zero values of the demand shock, gt, and of the expected future
output gap, xt
e, produce variability in both inflation and the output gap.
Hence, non-zero realizations of these variables do not create a trade-
off between output and inflation variability and it pays to fully offset
them. As a consequence, the sign of the output gap when inflation is
maintained at zero is independent of gt, and of the expected future
output gap, xt
e.
25 The superscripts s and f that are attached to it indicate that equations
(25) and (27) refer to the interest rate rules of strict and flexible inflation
targeters, respectively.
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subject to equation (5). The interest rate rule that
emerges in this case is given by26
(27)
Comparison of equations (25) and (27) reveals
that, for the same realizations of current shocks and
the same values of the expected future output gap
and inflation, both the nominal and the real interest
rates are lower in the second case. Furthermore, the
difference between the two interest rates is larger
the larger is the flexibility parameter, A. Using equa-
tion (25) in the expression for inflation (equation




The rate of inflation does not respond to the
demand shock or to the expected future output gap
because the full offsetting of those variables improves
performance on both the inflation and the output
gap objectives. On the other hand, some of the cost
shock and inflationary expectations are allowed to
pass through to inflation because, in the case of
those variables, there is a tradeoff between the infla-
tion and the output gap objectives. Because, in the
range ut+βπt
e≤ 0 the CB behaves as a strict inflation
targeter, inflation in this range is always at the zero
target. Using the interest rate rules for the two ranges
in equation (4) and rearranging, the output gaps in
the two ranges are given, respectively, by
(29)
Thus, in the first range the output gap is always non-
negative and in the second it is always negative, but
not by as much as it would have been in the absence
of some output stabilization by the CB.
Demonstration That Expected Inflation Is
Positive. Because there is no persistence in shocks
and no endogenous state variables, the expected
value of the rate of inflation is the same for any
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(30) Et–1πt=Etπt+1=…≡ Eπ ≡π
e,
so the time index attached to the expectation can
be deleted. It follows from equation (28), and from
the fact that in the range ut ≤ –βπt
e inflation is zero,
that
(31)
where F(u) is the distribution function of u and
where, without risk of confusion, the time index
has been suppressed because the distribution of u
is time invariant. This expression determines the
expected rate of inflation, π
e, but only implicitly
because π
e also appears on the right-hand side of
the equation. It is nonetheless possible to establish
that expected inflation is positive, even without an
explicit solution for it. Note that π
e=–∞ cannot be
a solution because, for that value of π
e, the right-
hand side of the equation would be zero and the
left-hand side –∞. Hence, –βπ
e>–∞. Because the
expected value of u is zero, it follows that the integral
on the extreme right-hand side of equation (31) is
positive, establishing that both average and expected
inflation are positive.
At first blush one may be tempted to conclude
from this finding that there is an inflationary bias.
But this is premature because in the present sticky-
price framework the average positive rate of inflation
may also be associated with a higher level of output.
It is thus more accurate to refer to it as an “inflation-
ary tendency” rather than an inflationary bias. The
following subsection shows that this inflationary
tendency is associated with an output gap that may
be positive on average.
The Average Value of the Output Gap. As
was the case with average inflation, because there
is no persistence in shocks and no endogenous
state variables, the expected value of the output
gap is the same for any horizon and is also the
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26 Equation (27) is obtained by minimizing equation (26) with respect
to xt, using the resulting first-order condition to solve for xt, equating
this expression with equation (4), and solving for the implied nominal
rate of interest, it
f .
27 Essentially the no-persistence assumption shuts off any adjustment
in inflationary expectations in response to changes in exogenous
economic conditions.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS Cukiermanindex and just denote it by x
e≡ Ex. Using equation
(29),
(32)
Expanding and using equation (31), this expression
can be shown to be equal, after some algebra, to
(33)
Thus, provided β<1 and because average inflation
is positive, the average output gap is positive as well.
But if β=1, the average output gap is zero. It is there-
fore important to have an idea about the meaning
and magnitude of the parameter β. Gali and Gertler
(1999, p. 207) refer to it as the subjective discount
factor and provide empirical estimates suggesting
that it is about two standard errors below 0.99, which
is the typical value used for this parameter in the
literature (op. cit. footnote 16). Hence, existing evi-
dence is not incompatible with the possibility that
1–β>0. It appears therefore that in a New Keynesian
world it is possible to obtain permanent gains in
output at the cost of permanently higher average
inflation. This obviously violates the long-run neu-
trality of monetary policy and may appear surpris-
ing at first sight. To understand the deeper origin of
this result, it is useful to digress and characterize
the behavior of the average values of inflation and
of the output gap when the CB is a strict inflation
targeter in the entire range of shock realizations.
Average Inflation and Output Gaps Under a
Strict Inflation Targeter as a Benchmark. In this
case the flexibility parameter, A, is equal to zero
and the interest rate rule in equation (25) applies
everywhere. Inserting the condition A=0 into equa-
tions (31) and (33) we obtain
(34) xe=πe=0.
Thus, under a strict inflation stabilizer, expected
inflation and the expected output gap are both at
their zero target values. Inserting equation (34) into
equation (25), the interest rate rule of a strict infla-
tion stabilizer is
which implies that the expected value (as well as
the average value) of the real interest rate is zero.












































Implications for Degree of Flexibility in
Targeting Inflation for Real Rates of Interest.
What are the implications for the average value of
real rates? Is it going to be above or below the aver-
age value of the real rate under strict inflation
targeting? There are two offsetting effects. On one
hand, because (1/λ)>(λ /(A+λ
2)), it follows from a
comparison of equations (25) and (27) that, for the
same shock realizations and expectations the real
rate under flexible targeting is always lower than
under strict targeting in the range of negative out-
put gaps. This effect tends to make the average value
of the real rate under flexible targeting lower than
under strict targeting. On the other hand, because
inflationary expectations are higher under flexible
targeting, a higher real rate is needed to achieve a
given rate of inflation under flexible targeting than
under strict targeting. This effect tends to make the
real rate higher under flexible targeting. The final
relation between the average level of real rates
under strict versus flexible inflation targeting
depends, therefore, on the relative strength of
those two effects. The high real rates experienced
during periods of disinflation suggest that, at least
during such periods, the second effect has domi-
nated the first one.
Summary Thoughts on the Long-Run
Nonneutrality of the New Keynesian
Framework and the Implications for
Transparency
The analysis above suggests that, in a New
Keynesian economy, a flexible inflation stabilizer
with asymmetric preferences induces more inflation,
on average, but also more output (at least when
β<1) than a strict inflation stabilizer. This implies
that, contrary to model 1 (from Section II on the
specification of models, pp. 19-20), in such an econ-
omy the CB faces (possibly within some restricted
range of low rates of inflation) a long-run tradeoff
between the average level of inflation and the average
level of the output gap.28 The ability to affect output
arises because, due to temporarily sticky prices,
the CB can influence the real rate by means of the
nominal rate of interest.
For a flexible inflation targeter with asymmetric
30 JULY/AUGUST 2002
28 The qualification restricting the statement to low rates of inflation
refers to the possibility that, when inflation increases beyond a certain
threshold, the intervals between price adjustments become shorter.
This ultimately pushes β toward 1 and eliminates any long-run tradeoff
between average inflation and the average output gap.
Cukierman REVIEWpreferences it is desirable to have a positive, rather
than a zero, average rate of inflation in order to be
able to reduce the magnitude of negative output
gaps when such gaps occur. As a consequence, the
average output gap, which was zero under a strict
inflation targeter, becomes positive. It is therefore
not quite appropriate to refer to the higher inflation
produced by the flexible targeter as a “bias.” I refer
to it instead as an “inflationary tendency.” Ultimately,
whether the CB or society prefers more inflation
and more stabilization of negative output gaps to
less inflation and less stabilization of such gaps is a
matter of taste.
But, to my knowledge, no CB has ever publicly
acknowledged that there might be such a tradeoff.
Thus, to the extent that there are at least some CBs
with asymmetric preferences, they have been
remarkably silent and opaque about the tradeoff
between output stabilization and inflation and about
their attitude to alternative values of the output gap.
For example, the public stance taken by most explicit
inflation targeters is that there is no relation between
the degree of flexibility in targeting inflation and
the average rate of inflation.
One possible reason for this position is that
public acknowledgment of asymmetric attitudes to
positive and negative output gaps may raise inflation-
ary expectations and necessitate a higher average
level of real rates, which CBs fear will depress the
average level of output and investment. Such a fear
is irrational in the models I have presented because,
by the rational expectations assumption, individuals
know what the true objectives of the CB are in any
case. But once this extreme informational assump-
tion is released for at least some individual price
setters in the economy, it becomes rational for the
CB to de-emphasize institutional factors that might
raise inflationary expectations. Simon has been
emphasizing cognitive and related limitations on
the individual’s ability to absorb information for
many years.29 In the presence of such cognitive
threshold effects within a sufficiently large fraction
of price setters, it is rational for CBs to de-emphasize
a high flexibility parameter and asymmetric prefer-
ences in order to maintain credibility.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main messages of the paper can be summa-
rized as follows. First, contemporary Western CBs are
rather opaque about the economic models they use
in reaching policy decisions, as well as about major
attributes of their objective functions. Second,
although Western CBs have recently been quite
precise about their inflation targets, there is substan-
tial haziness about output targets and about the
degree of flexibility allowed in targeting inflation.
Third, in a world characterized by uncertainty about
the future state of the economy, the shape of the
loss function over the entire range of inflation and
of output gaps shapes policy choices. All CBs have
been remarkably silent about that. This paper makes
a case for the existence of asymmetric attitudes to
positive and to negative output gaps, at least for
some CBs.30
It shows, both for sticky- and for flexible-price
transmission mechanisms, that in the presence of
such asymmetries and uncertainty about the upcom-
ing state of the economy there is an inflation bias
even when the CB targets potential output. The
reason is that such CBs are willing to tolerate some
higher inflation in order to reduce the risk of unex-
pectedly deep recession. This precautionary demand
for expansions is analogous to the precautionary
saving motive in the theory of consumption under
uncertainty, as generalized by Kimball (1990).
This “new inflation bias” result implies that, even
if Blinder (1998), Vickers (1998), and McCallum
(1995, 1997) are all right in believing that contem-
porary CBs target potential output, the risks of infla-
tion are not gone. Although, as in KPBG, the bias
arises because of the CB concern (at least in some
states of nature) about the output gap, the new bias
does not rely on dynamic inconsistency. The origin
of the bias resides, instead, in the precautionary
behavior of the CB, with respect to recessions in a
world of uncertainty, in conjunction with the public’s
awareness of this asymmetry in CB objectives.
Fourth, in sticky-price frameworks with forward-
looking pricing there is, within some range, a long-
run tradeoff between average inflation and average
output. Fifth, theory predicts that CBs with asym-
metric preferences will locate at a point along this
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29 A summary view with implications for economics appears in Simon
(1992). A recent enlightening discussion of Simon’s view for trans-
parency in monetary policy appears in Winkler (2000).
30 Casual observation suggests that most politicians definitely have
asymmetric attitudes toward positive and negative output gaps. During
periods of disinflation and attempted buildups of credibility, the CB
may behave as if it suffers a higher loss from an upward than from a
downward deviation of inflation from target. Nobay and Peel (1998)
analyze the case in which both the inflation and the output gap terms
in the loss function of the CB are asymmetric. Cukierman and Muscatelli
(2002) provide a general framework and related empirical work that
feature both types of asymmetries and make it possible to identify
the dominant asymmetry in each country.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS Cukiermantradeoff that is characterized by both positive average
inflation and a positive output gap. This finding
implies that asymmetrically inclined policymakers
who believe in sticky-price models of the economy
rather than in flexible-price expectations-augmented
Phillips curves are inherently more inflationary. But
this does not mean they have a larger bias, because
their policies also bring, under sufficiently low infla-
tion, a larger level of output.
Following conventional rational-expectations
practice, the new inflation bias story presented here
assumes that all agents in the economy are perfectly
rational and fully aware of what central bankers
are doing. Individuals familiar with the decision-
making process within CBs may argue that most
policymakers are not solving an explicit expected
utility maximization problem as postulated here.
Although probably true, this observation does not
necessarily invalidate the relevance of the new infla-
tion bias result. Policymakers can hedge against
deeper-than-wanted recessions by means of various
rules of thumb and institutional arrangements. The
next paragraph provides an illustration of such a
rule of thumb.
The view, currently held by some European CBs,
that current monetary policy can affect inflation
only in the second year after the implementation
of the policy may be thought of as such a built-in
institutional hedging device mainly against unex-
pected recessions. This device builds in a “flexible
inflation targeting” hedging procedure into the
policy process from the outset. The reason is that,
given this belief, it would be foolish to immediately
attempt to put inflation back on target following,
say, a cost shock. But the belief leading to this policy
prescription of flexible targeting may be disputed.
Woodford (1999), for example, as well as many New
Keynesians, appears to believe that monetary policy
can have an immediate impact on current inflation
via expected inflation. It thus is not unreasonable
to believe that part of the “two-year lag” institutional
belief is motivated by hedging behavior in the face
of uncertainty and asymmetries in the attitudes of
CBs about positive and negative output gaps.
Part of the haziness regarding objectives is
understandable in view of the fact that, in New
Keynesian models, inflationary expectations affect
current pricing decisions.31 In particular, a flexible
inflation targeter with a nonnegligible flexibility
parameter has good reason to appear less flexible
than he really is. This may have underlied the tra-
ditional, historical public position of the Bundesbank
according to which it was not concerned about out-
put, as well as a recent observation by Mervyn King
from the Bank of England. King’s argument is that
it is difficult to distinguish, in practice, between
strict and flexible inflation targeters because both
raise interest rates when inflation and output are
above target. I doubt that a strict inflation targeter
would have made such a statement. As a matter of
fact, CBs with asymmetric output gap concerns have,
in view of the new inflation bias result presented
here, a credibility reason for not highlighting this
fact. By contrast, simple monetary policy games
with signaling imply that a strict inflation targeter
would like to send messages that would make his
identity clear to the public.32 Such a “type” is unlikely
to claim that it is not possible to distinguish flexible
from strict inflation targeters.
Lack of transparency about objectives is probably
more easily remedied than lack of transparency
about economic models because the latter is largely
due to lack of consensus about the true model of
the economy within the economic profession. It
follows that significant advances in our understand-
ing of the channels of monetary policy are likely to
substantially raise the transparency about models
used and with it the accountability of CBs.
During the second part of the 1990s, many
Western economies experienced remarkably low
rates of inflation. Particularly striking is the experi-
ence of the United States, in which inflation was
quite low in spite of the powerful and persistent
expansion it went through during the last decade.
Is this all due to higher CB independence and a
stronger focus on price stability? It is likely that this
is part of the explanation, but not the whole story.33
This paper suggests an additional possibility.
Believing that the probability of recession is low,
those banks behaved nearly as strict inflation tar-
geters would have. This conjecture is supported by
the fact that inflation was low also in countries
whose CBs are flexible inflation targeters (with pos-
sibly asymmetric preferences). If correct, this con-
jecture also implies that, when the fears of recession
32 JULY/AUGUST 2002
31 Jensen (2000) shows that in such cases full transparency about objec-
tives is not necessarily desirable.
32 This is the implication of formal models of monetary policy games
with private information. Two simple formulations appear in Vickers
(1986) and in Cukierman (2000b).
33 Cukierman and Lippi (2001) identify an additional factor. The perma-
nent effects of the “new economy” in the United States were initially
underestimated, leading to overestimates of the output gap and, con-
sequently, to more restrictive monetary policies.
Cukierman REVIEWincrease again, inflation may take off as the (currently
latent) new inflationary bias of those banks comes
back into being.
Finally, to maintain the paper within manageable
proportions, I deliberately avoided a systematic
discussion of two important questions. Is full trans-
parency feasible, and is it always desirable? The
answer to the first question is likely to be “no,” as
suggested by Vickers (1998) and Winkler (2000).
This still leaves open a question about whether it is
desirable to extend transparency as far as the feasi-
bility constraints would allow. The answer to this
question is by no means clear cut. Recent arguments
for and against doing that appear in Faust and
Svensson (2001), Geraats (1999), Jensen (2000), and
Cukierman (2001) and are partially summarized in
the last paper. Fuller understanding of the benefits
and costs of transparency must await further econ-
omic outcomes as well as academic work.
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